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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE FEAR OF
FOREIGN PROSECUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES V. BALSYs
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court laid. to rest an ongoing debate
among the lower courts, which began some time in the late 1960's. 1 In
United States v. Balsys,2 the Supreme Court held that a witness with a real
and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign country may not assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid giving
testimony in a domestic proceeding. The Court relied on the historical
underpinnings of the self-incrimination clause and placed great emphasis on
3the pre-incorporation-era cases.
In our global community where international cooperation reaches much
further than the framers of the Constitution could have imagined, the
Supreme Court's focus on pre-incorporation-clause cases is unsatisfactory.
Alyozas Balsys faces a real and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign
government based on statements he is compelled to make at a hearing
conducted by the Office of Special Investigations of the Criminal Division,
Department of Justice ("OSI"). 4 The Supreme Court should extend the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to protect witnesses
who are compelled to incriminate themselves with their own testimony.
1. See, e.g., In re Parker, 411 F.2D 1067 (10 th Cir. 1969); In re Cardassi, 351 F.Supp
1080 (D. Conn. 1972); United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920 (4' Cir. 1986); United
States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (11t' Cir. 1997); United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998).
2. 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998).
3. See id at 2223-31. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V, which states in pertinent part that
"[n]o person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
4. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2221, The United States Justice Department, Criminal
Division created the OSI to seek out, denaturalize and deport individuals involved in Nazi
war crimes during World War II. See id at 2221-22.
5. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). In
Murphy the Court discussed two ideas: the essential and necessary role that the Fifth
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Part II of this Comment discusses the development of the self-
incrimination clause in the United States. This part considers the pre-
incorporation era cases wherein the Court held that a witness in a federal
court could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination based upon
fear of prosecution in a state court. 6 This Comment also considers the post-
incorporation-era when the Court changed its course and extended the self-
incrimination clause to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine
of incorporation7 and protected witnesses in federal court who feared that
their testimony would lead to prosecution in state court and vice versa. 8
Part III of this Comment analyzes the extension of the privilege against
self-incrimination to witnesses fearing foreign prosecution. This section
includes a discussion of United States v. Balsys9 and also explores the
divergent decisions of the lower courts in addressing the issue of whether
the self-incrimination clause should be extended to witnesses who fear
foreign prosecution. While several courts refused to extend the privilege
against self-incrimination to witnesses who feared foreign prosecution °
some have chosen to extend the privilege."
Part IV examines the role of the OSI in finding and deporting suspected
Nazi war criminals. The OSI was created for the sole purpose of seeking
out persons suspected of World War II war crimes and deporting them.12
In light of this unique role of the OSI, the United States is compiling
evidence for the criminal prosecution of witnesses such as Balsys and
thereby aids in their prosecution in foreign countries."
Part V discusses the policy issues at stake in allowing the privilege
against self-incrimination in this context. The Supreme Court has identified
strong policy interests against extending the privilege against self-
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination plays in the fair balance between the
individual and the state; and the fundamental values reflected by our unwillingness to force
a suspect into self-accusation.
6. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
7. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
8. See Murphy, 378 U.S. 52.
9. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218.
10. See, e.g., In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10 Cir. 1969); United States v. Gecas, 120
F.3d 1419 ( 1 1 " Cir.-1997).
11. See, e.g., In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Conn. 1972); United States v.
Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998). The Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Balsys was overturned by the Supreme Court. See Balsys, 118
S.Ct. at 2236.
12. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2221.
13. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1995).
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incrimination, 4 while both the dissent by Justice Breyer 5 and the Second
Circuit 6 cited strong policy reasons in favor of extending the privilege to
those with a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution.
This comment concludes that the court should extend the privilege
against self-incrimination to witnesses who face OSI hearings for possible
Nazi war crimes, despite the fact that they fear prosecution only by a
foreign government. The nature of the proceedings against the witness in
an OSI hearing support this conclusion. 17 In effect, the OSI prepares the
record for prosecution of the witness in a foreign country and then facilitates
that prosecution by deporting the witness. 18 Such cooperation between the
United States and the countries that prosecute Nazi war criminals makes it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to avail such a witness of the privilege
against self-incrimination.
11. HISTORY OF THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Pre-Incorporation Cases
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. 9 While the Supreme Court always upheld its necessity,20
14. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2234. The Supreme Court was skeptical about the standards
that would govern a proceeding to allow a witness to claim a fear of foreign prosecution and
seek the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. The Court saw many burdens arising
out of international agreements and the ability of United States courts to make policies which
affect the country's relationship to other nations as strong factors against allowing witnesses
to seek the privilege in this context. See id.
15. See id. at 2244. Justice Breyer found that the policy reasons for extending the self-
incrimination clause in a national context are also served in an international context: The
witness who fears prosecution by a foreign nation has the same rights of dignity and privacy
and the right to be protected from governmental overreaching. Therefore, there is no policy
distinction between the witness who fears prosecution in the United States and the witness
who fears prosecution in a foreign nation. See id.
16. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 130-31. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that there was little difference between the harm to governmental interests arising granting
the privilege to those who fear foreign prosecution and those who fear domestic prosecution,
and in light of the lack of distinction between the two situations, the Court of Appeals held
that the privilege should be extended in both circumstances. See id.
17. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1995).
18. See § 1182.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, (1892).
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21the scope and breath of the Fifth Amendment was often in question. In
Brown v. Walker22 the Court narrowed the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination to apply only where the witness could show that his fear
of conviction was real and substantial, rather than speculative or
imaginary.23
In 1905, the Court continued to narrow the scope of the privilege by
holding that the privilege against self-incrimination could not be invoked by
a witness in a state court who had received state immunity but feared
prosecution in federal court.24 The Court viewed the granting of state court
immunity as adequate to protect the rights of the witness. 25 The Court
followed the reasoning of Brown v. Walker26 and found that the witness
faced only an unsubstantial and remote danger of prosecution in federal
court based on his testimony in state court. 27  The court thus found it
unnecessary for the state to provide immunity in both state and federal
courts 28
Despite this limitation, the Supreme Court seemed to reverse itself one
year later in Ballman v. Fagin.29 In Ballman, the Court allowed a witness
in federal court to assert the privilege against self-incrimination based solely
on the fear of prosecution in state court.3° But the holding in Ballman
provided only the most narrow protection and contributed little in terms of
precedential value.31
However, this broadening of the Fifth Amendment lasted only until the
Court decided Hale v. Henkel.32 The Court considered circumstances
similar to Ballman and reversed its earlier holding, stating that a witness in
a federal proceeding could not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
21. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1-896); Jack v. .... 99 U.S. 372
(1905); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141
(1931); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. Brown, 161 U.S. 591.
23. See id. at 608 (quoting Queen v. Boyes, 1 Best & Smith 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730
(Q.B. 1861)).
24. See Jack, 199 U.S. 372.
25. See id. at 382.
26. See Brown, 161 U.S. 591.
27. See Jack, 199 U.S. at 381-82.
28. Id.
29. 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
30. See id.
31. See id. The decision in Ballman rests on Justice's Holmes' claim that Ballman was
exonerated from disclosures which would have exposed him to the penalties of the state law,
but does not discuss the reasoning for this decision. See id. at 195.
32. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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based solely on a fear of incrimination in state court.3 3 The Court in Henkel
found that fear of prosecution by a state court based on testimony given in
a federal proceeding was too remote to trigger the privilege 34 and held that
the only danger to consider was that arising within the same jurisdiction and
31under the same sovereignty.
Finally, in United States v. Murdock, 6 the Supreme Court put to rest
the controversy between Henkel and Ballman. The Court in Murdock
introduced the "same sovereign" rule to American jurisprudence, holding
that "full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government
compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to . . . the rules against
compulsory self-incrimination., 37  Thus, an individual in a federal
proceeding may be compelled to answer despite a real and substantial fear
of self-incrimination in a state proceeding.38
B. Incorporation and the Self-Incrimination Clause
Murdock remained the final word on the scope of the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause for over thirty years, until the Court decided
Malloy v. Hogan.39 The Court in Malloy held that the Fifth Amendment
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. °
While Malloy had no direct impact on the decision in Murdock, the
principle that the self-incrimination clause was applicable to the states under
33. See id.
34. See id. at 69.
35. See id.
36. 284 U.S. 141 (1933).
37. Id. at 149. The "same sovereign" rule has its roots in the English rule of evidence
against compulsory self-incrimination. This English rule is the basis for the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in Murdock held that the "same
sovereign" rule, and thus the Fifth Amendment, only protected a witness against self-
incrimination within the same jurisdiction and in the same sovereignty. See id.
38. See id.
39. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
40. See id. and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part, ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." Through the doctrine of incorporation, the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that certain
amendments of the Constitution must be applied to the states. See United States v. Balsys,
118 S.Ct. 2218, 2224-25 (1998). Under the Fourteenth Amendment the states are bound
not to deny citizens due process of law or equal protection. See id. The process of
incorporation was slow: the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, and yet clause-
by-clause incorporation of the amendments was still occurring in 1964 when Malloy v.
Hogan was decided. See id.
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the Fourteenth Amendment made reconsideration of the rule stated in
Murdock necessary.4" The Court did so immediately in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission.4 2 In Murphy, the Court considered a situation
where a witness who had been granted immunity in state court wanted to
invoke the self-incrimination clause based on fear of prosecution on federal
charges.'3 In light of Malloy, Murphy held that it was necessary to extend
the privilege in a situation where the witness could be "whipsawed into
incriminating himself under both state and federal law even though the
Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each."'
Murphy rejected the Court's conclusion in Murdock that the Fifth
Amendment mirrored the English rule of evidence against compulsory self-
incrimination.45 The Murdock Court then reasoned that because the English
rule did not allow a witness in one jurisdiction to invoke the privilege for
fear of prosecution in another jurisdiction, neither should the Fifth
Amendment privilege.46 Murphy stepped away from rigid adherence to the
English rule and declared that the underlying purpose of the clause was the
protection of personal privacy47 and the idea that "the privilege recognizes
the unseemliness, the insult to human dignity, created when a person must
convict himself out of his own mouth. ,48 In Balsys, the Supreme Court's
reliance upon Murdock in its refusal to extend the privilege against self-
incrimination is misplaced because the Murphy decision damages the
precidential value of Murdock.
49
41. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
42. See generally id.
43. See id. at 53. Murphy also recognized that witnesses who have received immunity
way be forced by the government to testify in a proceeding because the privilege against
self-incrimination protects the witness from those statements being used against him in
another jurisdiction. See id. at 77. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
expressly upheld the Government's right to exchange immunity for incrimination testimony.
See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443.
44. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
45. See id. at 78. The English rule against compulsory self-incrimination protects a
witness in an English court from being compelled to give testimony which could be used to
convict him. See id at 58. However, the privilege did not extend to compulsory
incrimination in a court outside the English jurisdiction. See id. at 61.
46. See Murdock, 284 U.S. at 149.
47. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77.
48. Id. at 63.
49. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2228-30. The Supreme Court wrestled with the Murphy
Court's rejection of the historical underpinnings of Murdock, but ultimately reconciled the
two cases by supporting both the acceptance in Murdock of the "same sovereign" rule and
the recognition in Murphy that state and federal courts became one sovereign after
incorporation. See id.
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HI. EXTENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION TO
WITNESSES FEARING FOREIGN PROSECUTION
A. United States v. Balsys
Alyozas Balsys resided in Woodhaven, New York, when the OSI
subpoenaed him to provide testimony regarding his wartime activities
between 1940 and 1944 and the circumstances surrounding his visa
application and subsequent immigration from Lithuania to the United
States. 0
Balsys appeared at the hearing but refused to answer any questions,
claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based
upon a fear of prosecution by a foreign nation.51 The OSI petitioned the
District Court to enforce the subpoena.52 The District Court found that
Balsys faced a real and substantial fear of prosecution by the foreign
governments of Lithuania and Israel, but refused to extend the privilege
against self-incrimination, finding the privilege inapplicable to a claim based
solely upon the possibility of prosecution by foreign countries.53
Balsys appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
vacated the District Court's ruling. 54 The court held that a witness who
faced a real and substantial danger of prosecution by a foreign government
could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid giving
testimony in a proceeding in the United States regardless of whether the
witness faced a danger of domestic prosecution by either state or federal
governments.55 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the goals of the
privilege against self-incrimination56 were not changed when the witness
faced a real and substantial fear of prosecution by a foreign government as
50. See id. at 2221.
51. Balsys claimed fear of prosecution under the laws of Germany, Lithuania and Israel.
See id.
52. See id.
53. See United States v. Balsys, 918 F.Supp 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). The District Court
held that that Fifth Amendment does not operate extra-territorily and only serves to regulate
the relationship between the federal and state governments, not the United States and foreign
governments. Therefore, application of the privilege beyond the scope of the United States
was not warranted. See id.
54. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218
(1998).
55. See id. at 140.
56. The Court identified the goals of the privilege against self-incrimination as preserving
individual dignity and privacy and protecting the individual from governmental
overreaching. See id. at 129.
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opposed to domestic prosecution.17 The court also found that the burden
placed on the government when the prosecuting authority was foreign was
not significantly different than the burden placed on the government when
the prosecuting authority was domestic.8 In light of these similarities, the
Court of Appeals held that there was no reason to refuse to extend the
privilege against self-incrimination to a witness who feared foreign
prosecution.59
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's ruling, holding that
"concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the self-
incrimination clause. "' The Court began by analyzing the text of the Fifth
Amendment.6' Mr. Balsys claimed that the use of the word "any" in the
self-incrimination clause lent textual support to his argument that the clause
should apply to any criminal proceeding, whether foreign or domestic.6z
However, the Court concluded that Balsys had misread the intent of the
text. 63 Instead, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment binds the federal
government (and through incorporation binds the states) but it cannot be
read to extend any further. 64
The Court then discussed the long history behind the self-incrimination
clause. 65 The Court discussed both the pre-incorporation-era cases and the
post-incorporation-era cases. 6 The Court considered United States v.
Murdock67 and defended its analysis of the historical background of the self-
incrimination clause.68 The Court endorsed the holding of Murdock, which
stated that the privilege against self-incrimination may not be invoked by a
witness facing prosecution by a different sovereignty. 69
57. See id. at 131.
58. See id. at 130.
59. See id.
60. United States v. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (1998).
61. See id. at 2222-23.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 2223.
64. See id. at 2223.
65. See id. at 2224-30.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 2224-26.
68. See id.
69. See id. The "same sovereign" rule as applied in the Murdock case simply means that
a witness in a federal proceeding could not seek the privilege against self-incrimination
based on fear of prosecution in a state court and vice versa. See Murdock, 290 U.S. at
149-50. State and federal governments were viewed as separate sovereigns in the Murdock
era and the "same sovereign" rule arose from an English doctrine which discussed
sovereignty in the traditional sense of two different nations. See id. This is the definition
of sovereignty that the Supreme Court used in Balsys. See Balsys, 118 U.S. at 2238-41.
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The Court discussed the radical change in the doctrine of the self-
incrimination clause privilege created by Malloy v. Hogan and Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission.70 Although the holding in Murphy seems to reverse
the holding in Murdock,71 the Court sought a way to reconcile the two cases
and rehabilitate Murdock.72 The Court reasoned that Murphy simply
recognized that the federal and state governments became one sovereignty
once Malloy incorporated the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment, thus making the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states.73
Without such a protection a witness could be "whipsawed" into giving
testimony to incriminate himself in both state and federal court although the
privilege exists in both.74 However, the Court refused to recognize the
other rationale upon which Murphy was founded, which rejected the
historical background of Murdock,75 and held that the privilege is grounded
in the concept of personal privacy.76
The Court also rejected the policy considerations which would support
extending the privilege to persons in Balsys's situation.77 Finding that
extending the privilege would involve the court in duties which were better
suited to the executive and legislative branches, the Court concluded that the
policy considerations were unpersuasive. The Court thus disposed of
Balsys's claim.79
70. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2226-30.
71. See id. Murdock held that the self-incrimination clause did not apply to a federal
witness who fears prosecution in state court. See Murdock, 284 U.S. at 149-50. On the
other hand, Murphy, necessitated by the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment in Malloy,
held that the privilege against self-incrimination could be invoked in such a situation. See
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
72. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2231.
73. See id.
74. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
75. See Balsys, 118 U.S. at 2231-35. Murdock was grounded in the belief that the
English rule of privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to prosecutions beyond
English sovereignty. See Murdock, 284 U.S. at 149. Murdock then goes on to apply this
rule to the Fifth Amendment. See id. Murphy also reviews the English rule against self-
incrimination, but finds Murdock's reliance on English history to be faulty. See Murphy,
378 U.S. at 78.
76. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 67.
77. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2232-35. The policy considerations discussed by the
Supreme Court were also addressed by the Second Circuit in Balsys when they chose to
extend the privilege against self-incrimination to witnesses with a real and substantial fear
of foreign prosecution. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 at 130-32 (2d Cir. 1997),
rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998).
78. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2234.
79. The author has been unable to locate any additional information regarding Alyozas
Balsys since this decision.
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B. The Circuit Split on the Scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause
Balsys is not the first case to come before the Supreme Court on this
issue. In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation,8 0 the
Court reviewed a case where the defendant sought to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination based on his fear of foreign prosecution. The
Court declined to address the direct issue, but found instead that the
defendant's fear of foreign prosecution was too remote to trigger protection
of the privilege. 81 Because the issue was unresolved, the Circuits were left
to decide the issue on their own.
In 1986, the Fourth Circuit was presented with the question of whether
to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to a witness with a real and
substantial fear of prosecution by the government of the Philippines in
United States v. (Under Seal).82 The Fourth Circuit refused to extend the
privilege because the Fifth Amendment would not prohibit the use of
compelled testimony in the Philippines, there was no privilege for an
immunized witness not to testify in a federal grand jury proceeding on the
grounds of fear of incrimination in the Philippines.83
In a holding strikingly similar to that of the Supreme Court in Balsys,
the Eleventh Circuit also refused to extend the privilege against self-
incrimination in United States v. Gecas. 4 Vytautas Gecas was also
summoned under an OSI subpoena to answer questions regarding his World
War II activities and possible involvement in Nazi war crimes.85 Gecas also
refused to provide testimony and invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination. 6 Although the factual scenarios are very similar, the results
were very different: while the Second Circuit chose to extend the privilege
against self-incrimination to Alyozas Balsys,87 the Eleventh Circuit refused
to extend the same privilege to Gecas u 8The E1venth Circuit found that the
civil nature of the OSI proceeding, coupled with a lack of historical
support for an extension of the privilege to witnesses facing foreign
80. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
81. See id. at 478-81.
82. 794 F.2d 920 (4h Cir. 1986).
83. See id. at 926.
84. 120 F.3d 1419 (11 th Cir. 1997)
85. See id. at 1422-23.
86. See id.
87. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 140 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218
(1998).
88. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1457.
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prosecution, was ample support for their decision not to extend the privilege
to Gecas.8 9
IV. COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE OSI
The Supreme Court rejected any appeal to cooperative internationalism
on Balsys's behalf to strengthen his argument for extending the scope of the
self-incrimination clause.' ° This rejection is unsatisfying considering the
complex relationships the United States forms with other countries. This is
particularly so in light of the goals, objectives and role the OSI plays within
those relationships. 91
The atrocities of World War II gave rise to a series of international
agreements to condemn the crime of genocide. 92 Further condemnation of
war crimes received wide spread publicity through the Trials at
Nuremberg . In these treaties and the Nuremberg trials the United States
and other nations of the world combined to make a pact to ferret out World
War II war criminals and bring them to justice via a collaborative
international effort.9 Despite the collaboration of several nations with
diverse views on what constitutes a "fair trial," the international community
was able to come up with a unified agreement that the basic protections of
due process would prevail. 95
It is against this backdrop that the OSI must be examined. The United
States Justice Department created the OSI to find suspected Nazi war
criminals living in the United States.96  Suspected individuals are
89. See id.
90. Cooperative internationalism is defined by the Supreme Court in Balsys as the theory
that nations have a greater incentive to work together to facilitate foreign prosecution
because crime has become increasingly international. See United States v. Balsys, 118 S.Ct.
2218, 2233-34 (1998).
91. See, e.g., Dianne Marie Aman, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1201, 1246 (1998).
92. See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; See also Aman,
supra note 91, at 1248.
93. See Aman, supra note 91, at 1248.
94. See id. and accompanying notes.
95. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Charter, supra note 92, art. 16., 82 U.N.T.S. at 1550. The treaty guarantees
the accused the right to indictment proceedings, the right to make a preliminary defense
against the charges prior to trial, the right to conduct his own defense or have the assistance
of counsel, the right to present evidence in his own defense and the right to cross-examine
witnesses.
96. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218 at 2 2 3 6 .
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investigated by the OSI and then subpoenaed to testify at an OSI hearing. 97
The witnesses are questioned about their activities during World War II and
their representations on visa applications for immigration to the United
States.98 If the OSI finds that the witnesses lied on their visa applications
and were involved in Nazi war crimes, they are then deported to their
countries of origin.' The OSI is granted broad power in sharing
information collected in these proceedings with the country of emigration."0
The OSI mandate allows the United States to prepare a record of the
suspect's World War II activities and information regarding his application
to the United States, using the testimony of the witness in the prosecution.'01
The Supreme Court has ruled that a deportation proceeding is a civil action,
not a criminal prosecution, therefore, individuals called to a deportation
proceeding to testify may not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse
to answer questions because the information could be used for
deportation.'02 Yet the Supreme Court allows this failure of justice to occur
based on its belief that the conduct and involvement of the OSI in foreign
prosecutions is not sufficiently close to say that the OSI and the prosecuting
nation are working together as one sovereignty. 103
The Supreme Court's broad conclusion fails to take into consideration
the true nature of the OSI proceeding and ignores the level of involvement
that the OSI has in bringing about foreign prosecutions. For example, the
OSI is mandated by an agreement between, amongst others, the United
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1995).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1995).
100. The OSI is required to "maintain liaison with foreign prosecution investigation and
intelligence offices; use appropriate Government agency resources and personnel for
investigations, guidance, information and analysis; and direct and co-ordinate the
investigation, prosecution and any other legal activities instituted in these cases with the
Immigration and Naturalization Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United
States Attorneys Offices and other relevant Federal agencies." See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at
2236.
101. The Court has held that "[a]t its core, the privilege reflects our fierce unwillingness
to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilema of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 495 U.S. 582, 596 (1990). The witness under suspicion
of Nazi war crimes faced with an OSI subpoena is burdened by the same trilema. See
United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998).
The witness can testify and face imminent prosecution by a foreign nation if he is deported
from the United States. See id. The alternatives to the witness are only perjury or the
refusal to answer which will place him in contempt of court. See id.
102. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 127. See also, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1038-39 (1984).
103. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct at 2 2 3 3- 34 .
[Vol. 19318
1999] THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
States and Lithuania (one of the countries wherein Balsys faces prosecution)
to aid in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals." Specifically, the
agreement provides that the United States, through the OSI, will cooperate
in the prosecution of persons who are alleged to have committed war
crimes. 10 5  This entails locating witnesses who may have relevant
information on war crimes and making those witnesses available to give
testimony in accordance with the laws of Lithuania. "6 These details of the
agreement reveal the deep intertwining between the OSI and the nation of
Lithuania. 107 The OSI is obligated to create a record which will be used in
Lithuania to try war criminals discovered in the United States. 10 8  In
essence, the OSI hearing serves as the equivalent of an indictment of the
suspected Nazi war criminal. Lithuania then employs this indictment in its
prosecution after the OSI deports the suspect. 109
Furthermore, the OSI also shares information gathered and testimony
provided at its hearing with Israel. "° While this agreement with Israel is
less formal than the agreement with Lithuania, the result is the same. "' The
witness in the OSI hearing is still being forced to incriminate himself,
despite the real and substantial threat of foreign prosecution. 112
The Supreme Court's insistence that the OSI's involvement in aiding
the prosecution of its witnesses in foreign countries is not enough to
constitute "cooperative internationalism" 113 is exposed in light of the true
nature of the OSI." 4 The OSI is intertwined with the government of
Lithuania to bring about the identification, deportation and prosecution of
Nazi war criminals.' It is this intertwining that should require the OSI to
extend to the witness the privilege against self-incrimination. Without such
protection, the witness is forced to indict himself in the OSI proceeding
despite the fact the privilege would apply if he faced prosecution in New









113. The Court denied that the interconnection between the United States and countries
like Israel and Lithuania gave the United States an incentive to use the OSI to gather
information at OSI hearing to aid in the foreign prosecution of OSI witnesses. See id. at
2232-33.
114. See id. at 2236.
115. See id.
319
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Jersey. '16 The situation is not different where the witness faces prosecution
in a foreign country in such a tight relationship with the United States as to
make the OSI hearing and the foreign prosecution one proceeding.' 17 The
Supreme Court left open the possibility that the privilege against self-
incrimination could be extended to witnesses fearing foreign prosecution,
yet it rejects the opportunity to do so in Balsys's case." 8
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING AN EXTENSION OF
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
Several policy considerations also support extending the privilege
against self-incrimination to witnesses who fear prosecution by foreign
governments. "9  The Supreme Court seems to find these policies
unpersuasive based upon its faulty understanding of the law. 120 Upon closer
examination, however, the Court's reluctance to recognize the policy
considerations has less to do with their unpersuasiveness than it has to with
the Court's unwillingness to extend the law in a new direction. 121
The privilege against self-incrimination has three purposes: the
advancement of individual integrity and privacy, 22 the protection of the
individual from overreaching by the state in its pursuit of criminal
prosecution, 23 and the promotion of the systematic values of the criminal
justice system. 12 The first purpose is not diminished when a foreign
116. See id. at 2237-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 at 130. (2nd Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S.Ct.
1,"11 0 / I Ant'ox
118. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2275.
119. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 128.
120. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2274-75.
121. See id. at 2272-73. The Court defers this decision to the legislative and executive
branches, hiding behind a false fear of complications arising out of the possible need for new
treaties and agreements to implement this extension of the privilege. See id. Such a fear
is unfounded. The Court need not find, nor does the witness request, that the privilege
against self-incrimination be extended to him at both the OSI proceeding and the foreign
prosecution. See id. at 2221, Balsys only requests that the protection of the self-
incrimination clause in the OSI hearing conducted within the jurisdiction of the United
States. See id.
122. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 133.
123. See id.
124. See id. The values of the criminal justice system, such as the protection of a fair
balance between the rights of the state and the rights of the accused, and the inherent value
recognized in the right to an adversarial trial underlie the purposes Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See id.
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government seeks prosecution; the invasion of privacy and integrity is no
less offensive when the government is foreign.25
The systematic policies of the criminal justice system that support the
privilege are only advanced when the witness can trust that his real and
substantial fear of prosecution will allow him to invoke the privilege.
126
Extending the privilege to witnesses who fear foreign prosecution will not
adversely effect the use of the privilege within the United States. 127 Due to
the highly publicized nature of all cases involving Nazi war criminals,
extension of the privilege to such cases will lend credence to the United
States' commitment to due process. 
128
The value of preventing government overreaching cannot be
overstated. 129 In light of the interrelated nature of OSI proceedings and
foreign prosecutions which follow, the OSI has incentives to resort to less-
than-fair procedures to ensure witness testimony.13 When the OSI
subpoenas a witness to testify in a hearing for suspected Nazi war crimes,
a great deal of work and investigation has already been expended.' The
OSI has ferreted out a suspect who may have been living in the United
States since the late 1940s or early 1950s. 132 The incentive to overreach in
this situation is exactly the same as the incentive to overreach in any
criminal case where a witness has been subpoenaed to testify. The privilege
against self-incrimination should be extended in such a case for the same
reason that it exists to protect against overreaching in any other criminal
case. 133
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found that a denial of the right against self-incrimination would have
no effect on witness testimony in OSI proceedings. 134 The Court found that
a witness probably would not respond to incriminating questions in an OSI
hearing and take the punishment for contempt of court rather than facing
prosecution and punishment in a foreign country."'
Such policy considerations lend significant weight to the argument that
the privilege against self-incrimination should be extended. Therefore, the
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 135-36.
128. See id. at 131.
129. See id. at 130.
130. See id.
131. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1995).
132. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2221.
133. See Balsys, 119 F.3d at 130.
134. See id. at 135-36.
135. See id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
policy considerations which underlie the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination must be carefully considered and weighed in each case
where a witness faces a real and substantial fear of self-incrimination by a
foreign government to determine whether the privilege and its purposes are
unjustifiably undercut by compulsory testimony. 1
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has settled the division among the Circuits in
deciding that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to
witnesses who fear prosecution by foreign governments. 137 However, the
Court's resolution of the matter is unsatisfactory. 138 The Court willfully
refuses to recognize the power and involvement of the OSI in bringing about
foreign prosecutions of witnesses who appear in OSI hearings.1 39 It is this
intertwining between the OSI and foreign governments which seek to
prosecute Nazi war criminals that creates a situation wherein the witness is
forced to incriminate himself in a United States proceeding to be prosecuted
by his testimony in a foreign jurisdiction.'40 Therefore, the Supreme Court
should reconsider its harsh position and extend to witnesses who seek the
protection of the Constitution the privilege against self-incrimination when
they fear real and substantial threats of foreign prosecution which are
created by the United States government.
Jessica Leigh Cadorine
136. See generally Balsys, 119 F.3d 122.
137. See generally Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218.
138. See, e.g., Aman, supra note 91, at 1207.
139. See Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2234.
140. See Daniel J. Lindsey, Tied Up by a "Gordian Knot": United States v. Gecas and
the Rejection of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Cases of Foreign Prosecution,
82 MINN. L. REv. 1297, 1325-26 (1998).
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